Sunday, February 26, 2012

Class #6, 2/27/12

**Roster, etc.

**Due tonight:
------>Read--in this order:
------>------>Thomas Aquinas--The Classical Cosmological Argument, pp 184ff
------>------>Saint Anselm--The Classical Ontological Argument, pp 169ff
------>------>Gaunilo--Critique of the Cosmological Argument, pp 171ff
------>------>Robert M. Adams--Moral Arguments for God's Existence, pp 231ff
------>Write:  OK, Which argument--or none--works for you?  Explain.  Remember that there is a possibility that even a segment of the believing community--like Pascal--doesn't buy the premise that one can rationally demonstrate God's existence.

**Tonight's discussion:
------>Who are these people?
------>------>Aquinas was a moderate rationalist:  how does this affect his confidence that we can argue with some assurance that God does exist?  What is his evidence?
------>------>Anselm's argument is very different from that of Aquinas--what is his point?
------>------>Some people claim that Anselm's argument is more like a word game or logic puzzle.  Do you think there is any validity to this, or does Anselm's argument convince you?
------>------>The "moral argument" suggests that the universal assumption of some standard of judgment (in moral terms) suggests a moral mind whose existence supports that assumption.  Are you convinced by this?
------>------>What, if anything, is the value of making "arguments" or building "a case" for the existence of God?  Is it helpful?

**If time:  Listen to the opening statements of two scholars representing opposite sides of the Intelligent Design argument.  Here's the link to part 1:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxK_Xs10Ung&feature=BFa&list=PLC34CF609D7F22AD6&lf=plpp_video

**For next week, 3/5/12:  The Problem of Evil
------>Read carefully:
------>------>Augustine's definition of the problem [HANDOUT]
------>------>David Hume, "Evil makes a Strong Case...," pp 276ff.
------>Write:  What sort of challenge exactly is evil to the human sense that there is a "higher power"?

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